Executive Summary
bench3.ai assessed the identified BENJI public execution surfaces across Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, Stellar, Solana and Aptos. The work addressed deployed identity, authorization and transfer restrictions, privileged issuance and settlement, cross-network request handling, non-EVM control configuration, and the public relationship between token balances and the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund. [E01-E07]
Assessment conclusion
No reportable vulnerability was confirmed in the examined public-production scope. This is not a clean conclusion for Aptos: C01 remains an unconfirmed conditional candidate because the public record does not establish who controls the sole funded holder key. If a funded, unfrozen holder is independently controlled outside issuer custody, the validated vanilla-transfer path would bypass the custom shareholder registry. C01 is excluded from the confirmed-vulnerability total.
| Classification | Recorded result |
|---|---|
| Confirmed vulnerabilities | Critical 0 | High 0 | Medium 0 | Low 0 |
| Conditional candidates | 1; C01 on Aptos, verification pending and excluded from confirmed totals |
| Control observations | 2; privileged Solana upgrade authority and Stellar signer concentration |
Material qualification
The private FTIS production worker, durable replay and finality store, post-scheduling freeze policy and reconciliation process were not available. Solana source/build correspondence is incomplete, and no authenticated end-to-end cross-network transfer was performed. These gaps constrain the opinion to the public components and recorded state described below. [E01-E04]